The preliminary system and final system plans of the U.S. Railway Association : and the response of the Rail Service Planning Office and the Interstate Commerce Commission / 277 by Due, John Fitzgerald

UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS LIBRARY
AT URBANA-CHA
..PAIGIN
BOOKSTACK3
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2012 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/preliminarysyste277duej

Faculty Working Papers
THE PRELIMINARY SYSTEM AND FINAL SYSTEM PLANS
OF THE U.S. RAILWAY ASSOCIATION AND THE RESPONSE
OF THE RAIL SERVICES PLANNING OFFICE AND THE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
John F. Due
#277
Transportation Research Paper #10
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

FACULTY WORKING PAPERS
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
October 7, 1975
THE PRELIMINARY SYSTEM AND FINAL SYSTEM PLANS
OF THE U.S. RAILWAY ASSOCIATION AND THE RESPONSE
OF THE RAIL SERVICES PLANNING OFFICE AND THE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
John F. Due
#277
Transportation Research Paper #10

>.
THE PRELIMINARY SYSTEM AND FINAL SYSTEM PLANS OF THE
U.S. RAILWAY ASSOCIATION AND THE. RESPONSE OF THE
RAIL SERVICES PLANNING OFFICE AND THE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE COMMISSION
John F. Due
Professor of Economics
University of Illinois, Urbana
September 1975

On February 26, 1975, the United States Railway Administration (USRA)
issued its Preliminary System Plan (PSP), as required by the Regional Rail
Reorganization Act of 1973. Slightly over a year had elapsed since the
Department of Transportation (DOT) had issued its proposal for restructuring
the northeast railroads: A Report by the Secretary of Transportation, Rail
*
2
Services in the Midwest and Northeast Region . In turn, in April, 1975, the
Rail Services Planning Office (RSPO) of the ICC issued its evaluation of the
3
plan. On July 26, 1975, USRA issued its Final System Plan (FSP), and on
August 25, 1975 the Interstate Commerce Commission issued its evaluation of
the final plan.
The USRA Preliminary Report
The USRA Preliminary Report is a much more carefully designed study than
the DOT volumes, which of necessity had to be produced very quickly. The pro-
jected network of lines to be included in CONRAIL is similar to the DOT plan,
but there are differences. The USRA report has had the advantage of a number
of specialized studies made during 1974, plus access to testimony presented to
RSPO at the extensive hearings held last year on the DOT proposalP
Washington; 1975, 2 vela.
2
Washington: 1974, 3 vols.
3Rail Services Planning Office, Interstate Commerce Commission, Evaluation
of the U.S. Railway Association's Preliminary System Plan (Washington: 1975)
.
4
U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission, Evaluation of the U.S. Railway
Association's Final System Plan (Washington 1975).
Rail Services Planning Office, Interstate Commerce Commission, The Public
Response to the Secretary of Transportation's Rail Services Report (Washington:
1975), 3 vols.
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Major Features of the Preliminary Plan
The major elements in the report, discussed in subsequent sections,
are as follows:
1. Analysis. of the causes of the financial difficulties of the
railroad industry and forecasts for the future.
2. Recognition of conflicting objectives in the legislation, with
stress placed on the requirement for financial viability of the new system.
3. Establishment of a single 15,000 mile CONRAIL to operate the
basic system of the bankrupt roads, rather than alternatives such as sale
of lines to solvent carriers, establishment of several CONRAILS, etc.
4. Inclusion in the system only of financially viable segments of
the bankrupt roads, the remainder being noted as "available for subsidy"
—
in other words, to be abandoned unless locally subsidized. Financial
viability is the sole criterion for inclusion.
5. Projections showing that while CONRAIL will be profitable by
1978, substantial infusion of Federal funds will be required— several
billion
— for rehabilitation and covering of deficits.
6. Preservation of competition in the Northeast by transfer of
certain lines to the Norfolk and Western and the Chessie system in order
for them to compete with CONRAIL in the Philadelphia-New York area.
7. The need for changes in regulatory policy and in governmental
emphasis on various forms of transport if the railroad industry is to
regain financial health.
8. Utilization of the Penn Central line from Washington to New York
for passenger service only; improvements in other corridor services are
proposed.
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In May, 1975, USRA issued a supplement to the Preliminary Plan
covering the Erie-Lackawanna (EL) , which had originally decided to stay
out of the CONRAIL and be reorganized separately and then reversed its
decision too late to be included in the original plan.
The supplement deals only with the EL 1,091 miles regarded as of
light density; the remaining 1,800 miles, primarily the main lines east
of Marion, Ohio, were regarded as suitable either for inclusion within
CONRAIL or acquisition by the Norfolk and Western. Of the 1,091 mile western
portion, only 192 miles are proposed for inclusion. The primary abandon-
ment would be the entire main line west of Mario a.
The RSPO Evaluation
As required by the legislation, RSPO conducted numerous hearings on
the proposed plan, and on the basis of the responses at the hearings and
its own analysis issued its Evaluation volume on April 28, 1975. The RSPO
report, while agreeing with certain conclusions, is on the whole critical
of the plan, as it was of the DOT's initial proposal in 1974. .
The basic cleavage is on the question of the extent to which light
traffic lines of the bankrupt roads are to be included in the system.
USRA followed strictly a financial profitability test and attributed much
of the difficulty of the bankrupt lines to excessive mileage; RSPO argues
that this approach is contrary to the objectives of the Act, and that
these lines are a minor source of losses, while highly important to the
areas served.
Evaluation of the Secretary of Transportation's Rail Services Report
(Washington: 1974).
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The key points in the RSPO evaluation can be summarized:
1. The USRA proposal is certainly "preliminary" but is not a "plan"
at all. It is unclear and lacks information on the decision making
involved and on details 'of implementation.
2. The network of lines to be included in the system is seriously
inadequate. The consequence is violent opposition from shippers and
communities; USRA has failed to attain the confidence of the public in
either its data or its methodology. USRA has regarded the light traffic
lines as of only local concern when they are of much broader impact.
3. The estimates of the Federal funds needed for CONRAIL are grossly
inadequate and the earnings projections clearly overoptimistic and
unrealistic.
4. A Mid Atlantic-EL system (MARC), built around the smaller roads
and the Erie-Lackawanna, is a preferable alternative to the proposed
extensions of the N and W and Chessie to compete with CONRAIL.
5. Given the inadequacies of the data, all light traffic lines should
be included in the system for two years pending further Information.
6. A grants system financed preferably by a universal tax on energy
should be established to aid in the rehabilitation of the entire railroad
network of the country.
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6. The existing properties are valued on a basis that considers net
earnings and net liquidation value.
7. A detailed estimate is made of manpower requirements. There is no
consideration whatever of the question of the need for readjusting train
crew size and other aspects of labor contracts, which are accepted as given.
8. Various approaches to gaining additional revenue are considered,
with stress on the establishment of a minimum charge per car, varying with
distance and weight.
9. The lines proposed for inclusion in CONRAIL are specified in detail,
as In PSP, and basically are the Fame; roughly 1,000 miles of line
were added, as contrasted to PSP, but 5»757 mjles will still be
excluded.? Obviously USRA paid very little attention to public protests and
RSPO recommendations.
The ICC calls attention to the tremendous difference between the plan's
value figures for the railroads and what the railroads claim: $471 million
vs. $7.4 billion for the Penn Central, for example. The problem of valuation
is greatly complicated by the existence of leased lines in the properties of
the bankrupt carriers.
2
Plus a net of 1158 miles of line now out of service, for a total of
6915 miles.

kn
USRA's Final Report (FSP)
The Final Report in part summarizes the presentation of the Preliminary
Report but some material is new. Volume I summarizes the recommendations,
elaborates on the details of the implementation of the plan, and analyzes in
some depth the financial potential of CONRAIL and the question of valuation
of assets. Volume II presents the final recommendations on each segment of
the line. The major elements in FSP can be summarized briefly:
1. The basic CONRAIL plan, plus transfer of some of the bankrupt
property lines to other carriers, is retained.
2. Failure of the Norfolk, and Western to acquire the designated lines
of the Erie-Lackawanna, coupled with the tentative willingness of the Che r ^xe
--<-«tn ro do so, resulted in substantial modification in the proposed struc-
ture of the eastern system. The N & W will remain much the same as it now
is; the Chessie will expand substantially through the acquisition of the
eastern portion of E-L and other lines.
3. The plan for transferring the Eastern Corridor main line from
Washington via New York to Boston to A MTRAK is reaffirmed; through freight
service will be operated on parallel lines of other roads.
4. Capital funds of $1.85 billion will be required from the Federal
government, with acquisition of debentures and preferred stock'J the creditors
of the bankrupt roads will receive equity interest in CONRAIL.
5. A detailed estimate of revenues and earnings is provided; positive
cash flow will be generated by 1979 and thereafter, and no additional Federal
funding will be required beyond that year.
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found unwarranted* The commission, unlike RSPO, accepts the ?0/'.30
subsidy rule,
60 The failure to stress the need for modifying labor agreements
is noted.
The Issues
Each of the major issues raised by the USRA reports will be summarized,
Dgether with responses of RSPO and ICC where applicable.
1. The Decline of the Railroad Industry (PSP 1 pp. 1-10; 309-19).
The sources of the decline of the railroad industry and of the north-
ist roads in particular are analyzed, utilizing the material of the
"HjSRAj Preliminary System Plan , _op. cit.
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Senate Commerce Committee study of the Perm Central and the Improving
2
Railroad Productivity volume. The rapid development of technology in
competing fields since 1930, in contrast to the slow rate of technological
development in the railroad industry, and the substantial governmental
investment and some subsidization of competing modes have played a major
role. Restrictive regulation, particularly in preventing downward
adjustments of rates by railroads to meet competition and to undertake
other forms of transport, has played a role in the difficulties. The
basic changes in the economy, developed in the Railroad Productivity
volume (e.g., relative increase in the services sector), added to the
difficulties, as well as geographic shifting of economic activity, which
resulted in excess capacity in many areas. The light traffic line
situation adds to the financial problems. The effects of the Penn Central
merger, as developed in the Commerce Committee volume, are reviewed.
The report sees both positive and negative factors affecting the
industry over the coming years. On the negative side, are slower growth in
GNP, further decentralization of industry, smaller automobiles, greater
regulatory freedom for trucks, increased truck size, and higher rail
maintenance costs not accompanied by similar increases for trucks. On
the positive side are the revival in the use of coal; higher fuel costs,
which affect competitors more severely; environmental concerns over
additional highway building; and expanded containerization.
The Penn Central and Other Railroads
, U. S. Senate Committee on
Commerce (Washington: 1973).
2
National Commission on Productivity and the Council of Economic
Advisers, 1973.

The Interstate Commerce Commission's Evaluation of the Final Plan
Late in August of 1975, the Interstate Commerce Commission itself
(as required by law), not the RSPO, issued its evaluation of the final plan.
In brief summary, the major points are as follows:
1. The CONRAIL plan should be accepted by Congress; despite defects,
it is basically satisfactory.
2. If the plan for Chessie acquisition of major routes is not
implemented, then a single CONRAIL is not acceptable because of the loss
of competition in the east, and should be accepted only as a temporary
emergency measure, pending implementation of a dual CONRAIL and MARC-EL
system.
3. The capital structure proposed is unsatisfactory; the obligations
that will be due to the Federal government will prevent the system from
becoming free of Federal domination. The government should not insist on
high priority for interest and dividend payments to it.
A. The forecasts of Increased traffic and revenue are unduly
optimistic, and therefore profits will be attained less soon than anticipated.
5. The plan for abandonment of substantial mileage is basically satis-
factory, but there are a number of marginal lines that warrant further study
before exclusion. Questions are raised about USRA's methodology. No attention
has been paid to lines of national as distinct from local interest. While
the states have made progress in planning for subsidization, some are not yet
in a position to act.
The Commission, therefore recommends changes in legislation that will
allow Federal subsidy provided anyone will put up 30% without the requirements
relating to the states being met; provide a system for further study of the
doubtful lines; and provide a means for adding them into CONRAIL if this is
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2. Financial Condition of the Railroad Industry (PSP, pp. 243-58).
An analysis of the earnings and the rate of return in the industry is
enlightening:
1. Net railway operating income has fallen over the post war years,
«
and particularly for the eastern region. The bankrupt roads have shown
deficits since 1967.
2. The return on investment has not reached 5% since 1945, has
trended downward, and in 1974 was only 3%.
3. Cross tie and rail replacement has run consistently below the
levels necessary to maintain the lines over long periods; the financial
picture is thus even worse than the rate of return figures suggest.
4. Cash flow has been inadequate to meet capital requirements. About
half is taken to meet the steadily rising fixed charges. The Class I
roads as a whole only generate about half as much cash as is necessary for
capital improvements; many do not generate enough to replace existing
rolling stock.
5. A substantial portion of the limited cash flow has been paid out
as dividends—reflecting deliberate transfer of capital out of the industry
into more profitable activities. One consequence has been a sharp
decline in working capital.
3. Conflict ing Objectives of the Legislation (PSP, pp. 11-16;
RSPO, pp. 17-18).
The conflicting objectives of the legislation are stressed, but
primary emphasis is placed by USRA upon the need for developing a system
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in the northeast that is financially viable—a prime feature of the
legislation, with limited consideration to the other objective of an
"adequate 11 system. In order to accomplish this result, the plan calls
for inclusion only of those lines whose revenues exceed their costs,
plus lines very close to this position and showing promise. As a part of
the viability principle, the report condemns—-and very appropriately
—
all forms of cross subsidization. Accordingly, the Federal-local subsidy
system as provided for in the legislation is regarded as a highly desirable
way of reconciling the. relative objectives of viability and adequacy.
A key element in RSPO's criticism relates to objectives. RSPO and ICG stress
the need for greater consideration to the adequacy, environmental, and
other criteria and less to financial viability, per se. This difference
in attitude will be discussed below with respect to light traffic lines.
RSPO does recognize the basic undesirability of cross subsidization, but
suggests that Congress may not.
4. The Need for Preserving the Northeast Rail System (PSP, pp. *L45-50)
USRA, as well as RSPO, stress the need for retention of the rail
system in the northeast and the rehabilitation of it, to allow improved
service and lower costs and lessen highway congestion. For example, if
Toledo had no rail service, an additional 1,400 trucks would enter and
leave the city daily. The report also shows the much greater fuel economy
of rail over motor carrier, except where traffic is very light. For the
economy as a whole, trucks produce 50% more tons of pollutants than the
railroads, while producing only a little over half the ton miles; thus
the energy and pollution advantages of the railroads are 4 to 1. Abandonment
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of the rail system in the Northeast would increase energy use 4 fold, and
pollution 40 times. This rule does not hold if traffic is very light (Fig. 2)
For a 15-mile haul, fuel use is less with trucks for movements under 150
tons (4 cars); alternatively, for a shipment of 220 tons, fuel cost is
less for trucks for movements under 11 miles. Thus while abandonment of
most lines would have disastrous effects on fuel use and pollution,
abandonment of very light traffic lines would not.
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5. The Basic CONRAIL System (PSP, pp. 31-50; 251-258; FSP, pp. 13-37.)
As noted in the introduction, USRA recommends that the viable lines
of the bankrupt roads be incorporated into a single CONRAIL system,
essentially a private profit making concern, although initially with
*
substantial Federal financial assistance and Federal majority on the
Board of Directors until obligations are met. Various alternatives, such
as a CONRAIL West and CONRAIL East, were rejected. CONRAIL would be made
up primarily of the Penn Central main lines, but with some routes from
other bankrupt carriers.
The key east-west route would be the former New York Central line via
Cleveland, the Pennsylvania line via Fort Wayne to be downgraded west of
Pittsburgh. A second major east-west route would be the ex-Pennsylvania
line from St. Louis via Indianapolis and Pittsburgh to New York (Figure 1).
In general, where former NYC and Pennsylvania routes more or less parallel
(e.g., St. Louis-Indianapolis) , one would be abandoned or downgraded
materially.
Rehabilitation would be centered on the main routes as specified,
with initially only patchwork repair on the branch lines, with completion
of overall rebuilding over 14 years.
RSPO is highly critical of the Plan for failing to specify adequately
just what the system does include, particularly the main lines and why
particular ones were chosen. RSPO raises some specific questions about
routes designated as main lines—for example, between Indianapolis and
Cincinnati, where the proposed route through Anderson and Union City adds
58 miles and 53% circuity over the ex-New York Central line via Shelbyville.
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6. Improved Operations' (PSP, pp. 55-94; 275-93).
Substantial effort was made by USRA to plan improved operations for
CONRAIL over those of the existing bankrupt roads. Stress is placed on
the need for a completely restructured system. The report considers at
some length the possible improvements in operating techniques as a means
of cost reduction. This is a highly complex task; the bankrupt roads
serve over 100,000 shippers directly and receive 42,000 carloads of
freight a day. These roads have substantially higher operating ratios
than the roads of the country as a whole, almost all of the difference
being in transportation expenses—those involved in running the trains
—
while they need a lower ratio because their car rental figures are so
much higher than the average. The source of the difference arises
mainly from lower productivity per man hour, particularly in yard operations,
In addition, much of the loss of time in transit arises out of handling
of cars in intermediate yards. Integrated planning and control were found
to be almost nonexistent. A prime requirement is to lessen the time freight
cars are idle in yards (Fig. 4).
Productivity in the industry was discussed at length. Wages have
risen much faster than productivity in recent years, a trend that must
be reversed, or rates will rise to noncompetitive levels. Labor agree-
ments stressing improved productivity of labor are regarded as imperative.
An analysis of existing track and equipment was made, and requirements
for track improvements and equipment acquisitions ascertained and specified.
For example, some 1,650 miles of new rail and 2.4 million ties must be
Over 60% of the tonnage, however, is supplied by 125 firms.
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installed annually over the next several years. One of the. major constraints
to the program is the limited potential output of the rail rolling mills,
even with current reduced general demand for steel. Freight car needs are
substantial; not only did the roads lag in their acquisition of new cars,
but they have an extremely high percentage (11) of cars not in usable
condition. Plans were designed for consolidation and improvement of shop
facilities; the Juniata shops in Altoona and the Hollidaysburg shops will
be the chief repair shops (diesels and freight cars respectively)
.
Costs of rehabilitation of lines range from $180,000 per mile for
major lines (maximum) to as low as $10,000 on light traffic lines.
There is little basic disagreement by RSPO in this sphere, but
questions are raised:
1. Some branch lines are in such bad condition that cost savings will
be greater through priority of rehabilitation of these over some main lines.
2. The estimated improvement in car utilization (31%) is believed to
be unrealistically high.
3. Inadequate attention is given to certain constraints on yard and
line capacity.
7. Piggyback Operation (PSP, pp. 259-302; RSPO, pp. 61-65).
USRA proposed major expansion in piggyback operation as one.
of the chief sources of additional traffic, and increased role of CONRAIL
in truck handling of the piggyback trailers.
RSPO expresses substantial skepticism over this proposal. First,
much of the service now operates at a loss—and expanding it will simply
increase losses. Secondly, any expansion is likely to come primarily
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from existing freight car traffic. RSPQ questions tlie need for the railroads
to extend the scope of their own trucking operations, urging better
cooperation with motor carriers as an alternative; and it has great doubt
about the desirability of seeking to regain small shipment traffic.
RSPO much prefers. the approach of seeking to get the over-the-road
trucking firms to use piggyback for their vehicles, rather than railroad
expansion of their operations of this nature. Yet present rail rates for
piggyback operation discourage over-the-road-truckers from shipping their
trailers by rail.
RSPO also urges a review of the old issue of piggyback vs. containers;
there is evidence that the U. S. railroads were in error in pushing
piggyback over containerization just because trailers could be loaded and
unloaded with little investment in facilities.
8. Financial Prospec ts for CONRAIL ( PSP, pp. 123-35; 193-217; FSP,
pp. 13-14; 37-47; 47-88; ice, • PP - 30-39.)
USRA reviews the financial prospects for CONRAIL. Traffic is expected
to increase, partly from improved service, partly from growth of the
economy, primarily in coal and piggyback traffic. An overall
24% Increase in traffic over the next ten years, or a compounded growth
rate of 1.4% a year, is forecast.
The overall projection shows that a profit can be earned by 1978^evised
in FSP to 1979) and a $382 million profit by 1985 ($355 million in FSP) . The
improved profit situation is attributable partly to cost reductions, partly to
increased traffic, and partly to appropriate rate adjustments to make all traffic
compensatory. Legislation allowing greater rate flexibility is regarded as .
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A basic change in accounting is proposed; instead of
treating track expenses entirely as operating expenses, as to presents ail
rehabilitation costs would be charged to capital account and not depreciated.
This proposal was abandoned in FSP.
RSPO is very critical of these estimates, believing them to be
excessively optimistic:
1. Projected increases in. traffic , ' particularly in coal, are be-
lieved to be overoptiraistic.
2. The report, while recognizing the possibility of inflation, plays
down its significance j inflation is almost certain to increase materially
the net cash outflow and require additional outside (i.e., government)
funding.
3. The expected projected reduction in expenses is overoptimistic,
on the basis of data available for comparable solvent Class I roads.
4. The improved financial structure is largely a result of write
down of the assets upon transfer of them to CONRAIL.
5. Failure to depreciate the rehabilitation costs, warranted only
under the assumption that these properties are perfectly maintained indefinite-
ly, is open to serious question, and the practice, of course, overstates profits,
In summary, RSPO argues that realistic projections are imperative and
that far more Federal funds will be required than suggested by USRA; USRA
makes only minor concessions in the final report.
9 « Personnel (USRA, pp. 158-65; RSPO, pp. 16; 66-69
The USRA report stresses the complexity of the present labor agreements
(there are 26 unions and a large number of separate contracts - note Fig. 5)
,
and the dominance of the seniority rule, which introduces rigidities. Under
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1B.0OC
ui 15,000
y 12.000 -
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FIGURE 5
EMPLOYEES OF RAILROADS IN REORGANIZATION;
BY UNION REPRESENTATION
'EXCLUDING THE ERIE t ACKAWANNA
roi ai. union ut piu'M 'i m i
lmm ovi i.r; n s.«>h
i
SOURCE: EMPLOYEE DATA SHEETS, 1/2/74
U S. RAILWAY ASSOCIATION
USRA,
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the legislation CONRAIL will be subject to the existing collective
bargaining agreements, a source of substantial Inf lexibilit:/. The report
stresses the need for improved productivity of labor but does not specify
how this is to be accomplished.
RSPO is somewhat critical of the failure of USRA. to include labor
unions in the planning process, and of failure to stress the role of
employees in the transition to CONRAIL. The evaluation report discusses
this question at some length, stressing that failure or success of CONRAIL
may depend more than anything else upon the way individuals are treated in
the process. The need for changes in contract rules and other features
of collective agreements are obvious, but they must be approached in a.
cooperative manner.
On the related matter of management, RSPO stresses the need for
early appointment of management personnel, and, of course
s
the need for
high quality personnel.
10. Preservation of Rail Competition (USRA, pp. 10-11; 19-36; ICC, pp. 5-14)
The analysis of competition in the USRA plan has essentially two
aspects, one part dealing with rail competition, the other with intermodal
competition. While intermodal competition has lessened the need for rail
competition, the report concludes that retention of rail competition in
major markets in the northeast is highly desirable. Only a relatively
few firms even now have direct siding access to more than one railroad;
extension of this form of direct competition is not feasible or necessary.
But it is desirable to provide indirect rail competition, in the form of
service in the general area by more than one carrier, thus offering
alternatives to shippers.
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Tho i/S-t'. preliminary proposal called for nompeti+.ion by C0.NRAI7 vith two systems*
both of which would be allocated segments of the bankrupt roads to extend their
territory:
1. Under PSP, the Norfolk and Western would acquire the portion of
the Erie Lackawanna from Buffalo to Newark, giving it direct access to the
New York area. The N and W had controlled the EL until the latter went
.into bankruptcy. This proposal* however, has been rejected by the N and W.
2. The Chessie system would acquire the line of the Reading into
Harrisburg and receive trackage rights over CONRAIL from Harrisburg to
Allentown and Philadelphia,, the Delaware, and Hudson being given rights
into Allentown. The Chessie has agreed, and also tentatively agreed to
purchase the eastern portion of the EL rejected by N and W.
As an alternative, if the two x'oads would not cooperate, USRA
suggested a separate Hid Atlantic-EL (MARC-EL) competitor for CONRAIL
consisting of the Erie Lackawanna, Reading, Jersey Central, and the
Lehigh Valley. In FSP S this approach is rejected.
The RSPO report is critical of the basic USRA three carrier plan:
1. Under the present structure the small bankrupt roads are important
feeders for the Chessie and the N and W. If most of their lines go to
CONRAIL, the effective competition may not be significant, despite some
expansion of their own lines.
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2. As noted, the solvent carriers might not—and in the case of the
N and W did not—participate.
RSPO strongly favored the MARC-EL approach, except that EL lines west
of Buffalo would not be included. This approach would, in RSPO's estimation,
provide much more effective competition (in conjunction with the solvent
roads) and be much easier to create, Much more service would be retained.
The existing long established service connections with the various
• phVpper'* v^i-id he retained* T-n e ICC "fevorn Vn<=* ft*HO-EL approach if +»hs
Ghessie Acquisition*? are not. implemented*
il
- Rail-Truck Competition (PSP pp. 116-122; 137-44). .
Detailed attention is given to intermodal competition, with the
following conclusions:
^
1. Truck competition has resulted in substantially lower rail rates
than would otherwise exist— the basic explanation of why the national
railroad financial position had been worsening despite rising (until 1975)
traffic volume,
2. Rail and truck are highly competitive for a substantial spectrum
of the present rail traffic, particularly of manufactured goods. One
study shows that 'shippers are willing on the average to pay 20% higher ratss
for truck service because of the service advantages. Truck rates (common
carrier) average only 18% more than rail rates on rar.iiT.--rt.ures, and owner--
operated truck costs are lower than rail rates on many manufactured goods.
9
(with 25% empty backhaul).
3. No more than 40% of the truck ton mileage moving in interstate
commerce is subject to regulation. The chief competition today for the
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rail traffic is the private operator, working long hours, having no
terminal costs, not subject to union restriction, and not infrequently, from
many indications, not being careful to obey hours regulations, speed limit
laws, weight limits and the like.
4. Reluctance of the I.C.C. to allow rail rate reductions to meet
water and truck competition, while having at least limited justification
in the past, has virtually none now, given the importance of the private
carriers, and has contributed to the railroad's difficulties. Changes in
regulatory policies allowing the railroads much greater flexibility in
setting rates are regarded as imperative.
12. Coordination with Solvent Roads (PSP, pp. 51-54; 259-76; -FSP, pp. 285-
374; RSPQ, pp. 11-13: 87-134; ICC, pp. 27-29).
The overall USRA plan involves proposals for cooperation with solvent
roads, in addition to those, noted above. There are several elements:
1. Proposals by solvent roads of measures that would lessen duplication
are listed. Examples include proposed abandonment of certain Penn Central lines,
with solvent carriers taking over service to customers at junction points,
and proposals for operation by trackage rights, either of solvent lines
on CONRAIL lines or CONRAIL operation on trackage of solvent roads.
2. A list of lines not to be included in CONRAIL and available for
sale to solvent roads, without impairing the profitability of CONRAIL.
These represent only a very small portion of the total lines not to be
included in CONRAIL; most lines will not be offered for sale to solvent
roads.
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A major line offered for sale Is the Delmarva Peninsular route with the
connecting car ferry to the Norfolk area, In which Southern Railway Is interested.
3. Lirtes to be offered for sale to' solvent roads but to be Included
in CONRAIL if not purchased. This group is small.
4. In PSP, a list of proposals by solvent roads to buy portions of
the bankrupt lines that USRA is not willing at present to approve because
of the effects upon CONRAIL. Some would take existing roads far out or
their existing territories; the Santa Fe to Buffalo and Pittsburgh the
1Grand Trunk, to Cincinnati, for example. These would of course be
significant proposals if the CONRAIL plan had been abandoned In favor of
controlled liquidation o,f Penn Central*
13. Light Traffic Lines (PSP, pp, 95-106- 327-52; FSP, vol. 2, pp. 1-17;
RSPO, pp. 14-16; 135-53U IGC,j pp.46-57 # )
The portion of the USRA plans, like the DOT plan before it s that has
attracted the greatest criticism, is that relating to light traffic lines.
The controversy centers around the extent to which t«hey contribute to the . •
financial problems of the railroads.
A. Contrast to the DOT Plan
.
There are several major differences in approach between the USRA
and DOT plans:
1. The USRA plan involves more detailed study of each individual
line and thus avoids the meat axe techniques of the DOT plan. The planned
reduction in mileage is substantially less than the DOT plan, for four
reasons
:
a. Only the bankrupt roads are covered, whereas the DOT plan was
concerned with all roads in the area.
Substantial expansion proposed by the Grand Trunk is rather curious;
the road is wholly owned by the Government of Canada.
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b. The USRA plan does not seek to force through traffic on a smaller
number of lines to the degree envisaged in the DOT plan. The proposed
elimination by DOT of the Peoria and Eastern portion of the Penn Central
(Peoria-lndianapolis) is a good example of the difference in policy.
But use of the principle remains as, for example, elimination of the
Indianapolis-Richmond line of the Penn Central.
c. Individual lines were evaluated on the basis of actual revenues
and costs attributable to the line, rather than on the basis of
traffic originating and terminating. The 75-car rule of DOT, under which
points originating or terminating less than 75 cars a year were disregarded,
has been eliminated.
d. USRA has included those lines which would cover costs with a
slight increase in traffic, whereas DOT did not.
The net result is somewhat smaller proposed abandonment (unless locally
subsidized), 7,300 miles (out of 23,900), in PSP, Including EL{ 6915 in FSP?
instead of 15,600 miles (out of about 46,000).
as
The report also, because of Its greater care and thoroughness, avoids
much of the error and confusion of the DOT report, as for example:
(1) The DOT report' contained some outright errors, lines being
shown on the map for abandonment: that DOT did not Intend, the Louisville and
Nashville's St. Louis line, for example.
(2) The implication that points on lines to- be retained would not
receive service if they originated or terminated under 75 cars a year-
—
.
apparently not intended by DOT—has been eliminated.
(3) Effort was made to insure that traffic was assigned to the
correct stations., although, according to the RSPO evaluation, some errors
remain.
1
Including the supplement on the Erie-Lackawanna,
2
1158 miles of this figure are out of service.
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For the Final System plan, reconsideration was given to all lines about
which there was question; errors pointed out by RSPO were Corrected; and
some lines were further segmented to ascertain profitable portions.
Basically, however, che same criteria were used; the lines added back in
FSP were ones on which errors had been taade s a few through routes recognized
to be essential, and profitable sub-segments of other lines.
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B. The General Approach .
Despite the differences from the DOT plan, the USRA plan follows a very
harsh approach. As noted, the basic rule is simplet a line must contribute
more in revenues than in costs if it is to be retained (or must come
very close to doing so) ; the financial viability criterion is the sole
one used. This point of view reflects essentially the philosophy of
George Hilton and others that the railroads should cease to be "retailers"
of transport service; that they should essentially operate only main lines,
with unit trains of bulk commodities and integral piggyback or container
1
trains operating between major cities.
The sources of the existence of light traffic lines are explored in PSP:
competitive overbuilding
v
shifts in location of economic activity, and the
development of trucking being the most important
s
plus rail mergers themselves.
Failure of the I.C.C. to give abandonment approval often has resulted in
de facto abandonment—deterioration of track and service to the point at
which the line is of little value to the communities. PSP and FSP both conclude
that the light traffic lines do constitute a significant element in the
financial problem of the railroads in the area, and that CONEAIL must be
confined to those lines that are financially self supporting, or will be
In the near future. Yet the report also estimates that the total cost
of keeping the light traffic lines in operation is about $38 million
a year; thus only $1.1 million of local subsidy and $27 million, of Federal
subsidy would be required to retain them.
c - The USRA Techniques .
The approach followed involved first of all the identification of
light traffic lines. These were largely identified from those designated
The extremists would go much farther than USRA does in abandoning lirtes,
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as potentially excess by the DOT report, plus lines for which abandonment
had been considered by the railroads and ones suggested by the USRA staff.
These lines were then divided into segments, and each segment evaluated
on the basis of profitability alone: would it yield more in revenue than
it would add to CONRAIL's total cost?
The method involves the following:
1. All revenue generated from the traffic on the line—usually the
entire amount received by the carrier (but not the share of the joint rates
received by other carriers) was determined.
2. From this figure, the cost attributable to the line was subtracted:
a. On-line cost.
(1) Operating costs of the line, calculated by using system averages per mile or
per hour or day. The. labor costs were determined on the basis of service
hours and overall cost per service hour, given the size of the crew.
(2) Track maintenance costs, based upon the typical cost of maintaining
lines, given traffic density and other factors influencing costs.
(3) P^eturn on salvage value, based upon an estimated value of the rails,
«
value of good ties, and value of land, using an S.3% rate of return.
• (4) Some overhead supervisory costs allocated to the line.
(5) Cost of reconstructing the line to Class I standards (10 m.p.h.).
b. Off-line costs of handling the traffic to and from the line; these
were calculated on the basis of I.C.C. costing data, which attempts to
ascertain the marginal or out-of-pocket cost of handling additional traffic
on the main lines. This is a more sophisticated approach than the I.C.C's
50% rule commonly used in abandonment decision making.

Following the computer ascertainment of profitability, each line was
reviewed to see whether there had been new traffic since 1973, the year of
the computerized data, and if there were strong possibilities of immediate
growth.
Thus, in general, USRA did seek to follow the rule of comparing costs
with benefits on each line—but it did so on the basis of system averages for
coats and a calculated measure of out-of-pocket costs on the main line, rather
than ascertaining the actual costs on the particular .line; and it did so
strictly in terms of profitability without regard to externalities or effects
upon the communities.
D
-
Impact Study. (USRA, pp. 369-78).
The report included a general study of the impact of abandonment,
seeking to ascertain the effects upon employment, income, and transport
costs. The procedure was as follows:
1. For each county in a sample (510), it was assumed that all
activities of the given type would lose rail service if the line was
abandoned.
2. It was assumed that all types of economic activity used inbound
and outbound rail service to the same extent as the national average for
the type of activity. The results were then adjusted by the ratio of the
traffic generated on the potentially excess lines in the. county to total
traffic for the DOT zone in which the county was located.
3. The additional transportation cost was calculated as the difference
between rail and common carrier motor costs.
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The conclusion reached was that the overall Impact on these counties
of the abandonment of rail service would be extremely low. In only 32 of
510 counties do any of the changes exceed 3% of the total; in only 15
does the loss in employment exceed 1%. This conclusion is reemphasized in FSP.
E. Subsidy ,
The Report stresses the fact that some of the lines not to be Included
in the system may be regarded as justifiable by the local communities.
The legislation provides for a subsidy system— the Federal government
putting up 70% of the amount of the subsidy if the locality, state, or
other unit will take the initiative and put up 30%, Certain other conditions •
must also be met. The Federal subsidy is provided for two years only,
although of course Congress may extend the provision. The amount available
for each state is limited.
F. Criticism .
This portion of the report received by far the most criticism at the
RSPO hearings, and it is this portion of which R3P0 is most critical—a^;
it was of the DOT plan. A number of objections are raised:
1. The approach of USRA was wholly negative: what lines can be
excluded from C0NRA1L, under the philosophy that much of the difficulty of
the bankrupt roads arose out of ''excess capacity. 11 The report assumes that
other money-losing aspects of the lines can be overcome (e.g., losses on
Piggyback traffic) but those on the light traffic lines cannot-- they must be
eliminated from the system. The sole test used is financial viability
—
despite the multiple objectives of the Act. Many of these services are of
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national Impact; RSPO argues that Congress, in funding CONRAIL, presumed
that not all individual lines would be self supporting.
2. The subsidy system as established by law has merit for services
of primarily local benefit, but it can be argued that such services have
important national impact, and the continuation of the lines should not
have to rest on willingness of local units to take the initiative. Many
states
—
given the legislative processes—-are not yet in a position to act
on the provision of subsidies, yet the lines will be lost if the plan is
implemented in its present form.
The ICC stresses this aspect and the failure to consider some lines as
being of entirely national concern.
3. The input data were obviously inaccurate, though not as badly so
as those underlying the DOT plan of 1974. The data were obtained from the
railroads and contain numerous errors, as became evident at the RSPO
hearings;, data of frequency of trips, time necessary, condition of the
track (affecting reconstruction expenses), revenue attributable to the line
were frequently in error. For example, on two lines, costs were overstated
by 43 and 47% respectively. Differences between billing point and shipping
point—a major source of trouble in the DOT study—were not fully corrected.
4, There were serious errors in methodology;
a. The rather arbitrary basis for selection of lines to be. retained.
b. The artificial division of these lines into segments—leading to
exclusions that would not occur if the entire line were considered.
c. Excluding lines that are out of service but if placed back in
service could be self supporting.
d. Failure to consider the entire contribution of the line to CORRAIL
revenues, and to railroad system revenues,' instead of that to the parti-
cular bankrupt road of which it Is
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a part. The lines involved generated a total of $70 million a year to
the owning roads but $200 million to the railroads as a whole.
e. .Lack of explicit explanation in the report of why through traffic
was omitted from some lines but not others, or in other words, why some
lines were selected for through routes instead of others.
f. Use of a statistical approach, involving use of system averages for
each line instead of seeking to determine actual costs for each line.
g. Inconsistency of statements relating to reconstruction costs for
these lines..
h. Unjustifiable application of "overhead costs" to the lines when
in fact overhead probably would not be reduced by elimination of the lines.
i. Requirement of a return on salvage value—when no such requirement
is applied to the system as a whole. The best that is hoped for CONRAIL
is earnings comparable to the rest of the industry—and much less than the
8.3% used in the calculations. This is a very basic defect in the USRA's
reasoning,
j. Use of system averages, resulting in a salvage value of over $20,000
per mile and land values of $500 an acre—clearly unreasonably high, as the
ICC stresses.
This figure would provide a total value for all lines to be abandoned of
$175 million, while the entire system to be acquired is valued at $651
million.
K. Failure to give adequate attention to the possibility of profitable
operation of parts of branches if taken over by another road, lessening
total mileage on the branch. In some instances USRA appears to be very
unreasonable in refusing to offer such segments for sale. There is no
effective means in the legislation or the plane to ensure that the other
roads will take over these lines, even if they are offered to them.

5. Failure to recognize that while the overall impact effects may not
be great, effect on particular communities may be disastrous; Canajoharie,
New York is given as a specific example. 'The absolute insistence of USRA
that damage to communities is not to be considered is a basic difficulty
with the approach used. '
*
6. Examination of each line separately results in complete withdrawal
of rail service from large areas—the upper portion of the lower peninsula
of Michigan being the prime example, contrary to the intent of the law.
The major conclusion RSPO reaches
s
after examining the testimony on
each line, is that the basic data used are so defective that all
lines
should be included in CONRAIL for a two-year period to allow careful
appraisal of each line. This would require a subsidy of only $35 million
for the two-year period, Detailed analysis line by line shows that
• subsidization of all the lines would fall within the sum provided by
Congress for subsidy.
The ICC, however, rejects this RSPO proposal as too extreme in the opposite
direction. It stresses the immediate problem, that some states are unable,
for constitutional reasons, to act quickly enough to meet the requirements,
and there is no means whereby lines not now included can be added following
study. The ICC, therefore, proposes amendments to the legislation that
would allow retention of lines for which anyone would put up 30% of the
subsidy, even though the requirements of state legislation had not been met,
and provide for further study of marginal lines and inclusion with CONRAIL
of those whose retention is found to be warranted.
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G. The Overall Results by State
Table 4 shows the PSP proposals by state in terms of mileage. By far the
heaviest loser is Michigan; 1,333 miles, more than half the mileage of the
bankrupt roads in the state, would not be included in the system and thus
abandoned unless subsidized locally. Primarily this consists of the Perm
Central lines into the upper portion of the lower peninsula; abandonment
of these, together with the abandonments being independently proposed by
the C and 0, would leave the entire upper portion of the lower peninsula
without rail' service except the Detroit and Mackinac's line along the east
coast. Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York and Indiana would be the other major
losers.
Most of Vol. II of both preliminary and final reports is devoted to
analysis of each Individual segment regarded as of light density.
H - An Analysis of the Proposals for Indiana .
For this paper, the state of Indiana was chosen for an analysis of the
USRA plan recommendations because of Its diverse agricultural, manufacturing,

TABLE 4
THE REGIONAL RAIL SYSTEM
The bankrupt carriers in the Northeast and Midwest comprise oniy a part
of the rail network of that area.
The following chart presents ConRail in the perspective of these overall
rail services.
STATE
TOTAL MILES
OF ALL RAILROADS
Connecticut 816
Delaware 293
District of
Columbia. 99
Illinois 14,446
Indiana 7,118
Maine 1,907
Maryland 1,313
Massachusetts l s 639
Michigan 6,990
New Hampshire
. 911
New Jersey 2,008
New York 6,618
Ohio 9,182
Pennsylvania 10,374
Rhode Island 159
Vermont 767
Virginia 4 , 349
West Virginia 4,127
TOTAL MILES
OF BANKRUPT
RAILROADS *
596
257
13
1,322
2,845
450
768
2,163
1,324
2,980
3,572
5
,
1 6 ;
109
81
370
PRELIMINARY SYSTEM
PLAN TOTAL MILEE
TO BE INCLUDED
IN CONRAIL
LIGHT DENSITY
LINES AVAILABLE
FOR SUBSIDY AND
FURTHER STUDY
446.4 142.5
194.0 57.2
13.0 -
659.3 353.5
1,927.1 714.8
206.9 195.0
534.7 208.9
780.9 1,332.7
956.8 2.11.6
1,973.9 824.4
2,230.5 940.3
3,947.8 891.7
51.7 57.3
16.8 59.2
172.2 51.1
TOTAL 73,116 22,317 15,155.0 6,040.2
*Mileage owned or operated under lease by railroads in reorganisation; Erie Lackawanna
mileage is not included, Mileage does include approximated 1,000 miles of out of
service rail line.
From Statement of Arthur D. Lewis, Chairman of USRA,
Released February 26, 1975.

and mining activities, - Sixty-three segments were analyzed by USRA,
including several extending into adjacent states, with a total of 1,.458
miles. These were all either light density routes or secondary main lines
parallelling other lines* Thirteen of the 63, with mileage of 224, were
lines not proposed as excess by the 1974 DOT report,
Of the 63 segments, one was not reviewed by USRA because it is
technically an independent road (Central Indiana) . Inclusion in the system
was proposed in PSP for 26 segments totalling 637 miles, while 36 segraents,
totalling 789 miles, were not recommended for inclusion. Of the 26 proposed for
retention (the DOT plan had proposed all except nine of these for abandonment)
J
13, with 406 miles, were regarded as justified as through routes; another
13, with 231 miles of line were found to have adequate traffic for profitable
operation.
Analysis was made in this study of those NOT proposed for inclusion
in the system, on the basis of traffic potential and potential effect upon
the communities. The results are indicated below.
1. Re. ten t ion justified. Seven segments are clearly justified for
retention; five with some modifications of present operations should be
able to cover costs, and the other two (essentially one line) of great
2
significance for the area served, should come close to doing so." The
lines are as follows
:
1
See also Technical Statement, William R. Black, Governor's Rail Task
Force, Before RSPO
,
Ex Parte 293 (Sub. Wo. 9), March 1975. The conclusions
in this statement are similar to the author's analysis, made independently.
2
Two of these have been added into the final plan by USRA.
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USRA Ca cloads
t Line Miles Principal Stations per Year
F 593 Gosport Jct.-
Spencer
9 Spencer 1 ,361
'F 633 Indianapolis- 67
2
Carthage 1 ,299
Richmond
Knightstown
Centerville
Charlottesville
Greenfield -
Gem
Other j total
105
440
117
577 *
180
224
579a Knights town-
Carthage
6 Carthage (1 ,299)
S 520 Richmond-Eaton 14 Eaton
Other
1 ,063
73
S 630 Effner-Kenneth 56 Remington
Goodland
Wolcott
Other stations
927
945
159
84
589 N. Vernon-.
N. Madison
19 Madison 806 •
N. Madison- 3 Wirt 73
Madison
Vernon 49
Traffic,
Week
27
295~
26
22
87
19
Mile'
151
228
223
81
82
42
Required
Subsidy
nd
nd
95
117
Suggested take over by L&N. This is a portion of the Martinsville-Rincon Jet. line.
"Served by the Knightstown-Carthage branch, which can only be operated from the
Indianapolis-Richmond line if the track north of Knightstown is abandoned. Building
of an interchange track will be necessary at Knightstown.
Including through traffic.
Originated or terminated.
F: Added to final plan as part of longer line,
PF:
(
Part added to final plan (32 mi).
S: To be offered to solvent carrier.
nd: Not determinable.
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The USRA proposal for abandonment of the Indianapolis-Richmond line and
the Effner-Kenneth line, in themselves profitable, reflects a carryover of
the DOT philosophy of concentrating through traffic on fewer lines—but
in doing so it would deprive communities shipping substantial quantities by
rail of continued service. Service to Spencer was provided in the final
plan as a result of retention of the Rincon Jct.-Martinville line. The
Madison line should logically be transferred to the C and - B and
system, which once was interested but now is not, or operated as an
independent road. While this line is marginal, the traffic available and
the future potential clearly warrant retention. All of these lines offer
over 40 cars per mile per year and 19 or more cars per week.
A second group warrants serious consideration for retention by a
local company or governmental unit:
USRA
f Line
Brookville-
Cedar Grove
Miles
7
Principal Stations
Brookville
Ca
pe
rloads
c Year
685
Traff
Cars
Wee
:±c.
per
ik
Cars per
Mile
104
Required
Subsidy
(000s)
571 14
418 Kendallville-
LaGrange^
15 LaGrange 342 7 23 nd
429 Decatur-BerneJ 12 Berne \
Monroe
J
159
105
5 22 nd
399 Goshen-
Shipshewanna
17 Shipshewanna *>
fMiddlebury
275
178 9 30 31
417 Auburn Jct.-
Auburn^-*-*
2 Auburn 269 5 135 29
574 Lebanon-Brant 24 Rock Island 212
Augusta • 418 20 44
Zionsville 285
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596 Duff Jet.- ~
Washington
2 Washington
FP 577a Kankakee-Sheff 38 Beaverville
Donovan
Raub
Iroquois
85
204
184
109
109
1.6
47
37
64
16
nd
Transfer to the B and required.
2
Justified because of very short distance.
3
Part of a longer line; retention of the remainder is not warranted.
FP: Part included in Final Plan; 12 mi. of 574; 8 mi. of 577a.
Two of these lines, the Lebanon-Brant and Kankakee-Sheff lines, have
traffic volume in excess of some lines given top priority but only because of
traffic supplied by points also having access to other lines. Preservation
of them as through routes appears less necessary than those given top
priority but still desirable. The other lines are of considerable importance
to the communities served, and retention can be justified on the basis
of community interests, but they are not likely to be -fully self-supporting.
2. Retention Unj us
t
if ied . At the other extreme, there are two groups
the abandonment of which is clearly warranted:
a. Six segments > totalling 94 miles s made no contribution at all.
Three of these have only nominal traffic— two carloads or less generated
per mile—-and three are parts of unneeded through routes with no local shippers.
b. Twelve segments, totalling 237 miles, have such limited traffic
that there is no possible economic justification; all offer less than five
cars a week traffic, and all except one less than ten cars per mile.
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3. Marginal. A third group, with six segments and 167 miles, is
strictly marginal and probably could not be operated even by a local
company without a subsidy; the lines average 6 cars per week and 12 cars
per mile. These are:
USRA
1! Line
420 North Manchester-Mexico
524 Kokomo-Elwood
554 Hunter-Glen Karn
571a • Cedar Grove-Valley Jet.
401 Angola-Montgomery
FA 467 Michigan City- Buchanan
FA: To be offered to AMTRAK in final plan.
Traffic Required
Carloads Cars per Cars per Subsidy
Miles per year
175
Week Mile (000s)
nd23 3 7
IS 177 3 10 38
64 196 12 10 nd
19 385 7 20
15 258 5 17 nd
28 16 6 11 nd
Thus, in summary:
Total considered
Included by USRA
Not considered
Proposed for abandonment by USRA
Evaluation results:
Hopeless
No justification
Doubtful justification
Subtotal
Some justification to retain
Top priority to retain
Subtotal
Segments Mileage PSP Mileage FSP
63 1,458 1,458
26 637 732
1 32 (an independent :
36 789 694
6 94 94
12 237 205
6 167 167
498 466
8 117 97
7 174 133
25 291 230
The total number of segments evaluated is 71, since portions of 8
lines are treated differently than the other portions.
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Retention of the 133 top priority miles, most of them on through routes
that are in themselves profitable, would lessen most of the economic damage
to be done by the restructuring, and retention of the additional 97 would
eliminate virtually all, damage. If not retained in the system or taken
over by other roads, all the top. priority lines
and most of the second group would cover costs if operated by local
1
companies with the proper rate division. These segments are evaluated on
the basis of their local traffic only, xvithout regard to their desirability
as through routes.
HtSRA is reportedly very unsympathetic to the
"local company" approach.
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The final flan involves very little adjustment. Three adjustments were
made, three in the top priority list above, one in the second, and sale
of other segments was proposed for continued operation:
1. The Gosport Junction-Spencer line will be retained as a part of
a longer segment. (The 42 mile line from Rincon Jet. to Martinsville.)
2. A portion of the Indianapolis*. Richmond line, between Indianapolis
and Charlottesville and a ten mile eastern segment.
3. Half of the Lebanon-Brant line, from Brant to Zionsville.
4. Eight miles of the Kankakee-Sheff line from Sheff to Sheldon, to
be offered Co the Toledo Peoria and Western, but retained in CONRAIL If
not purchased.
In addition, three segments are proposed for sale: Effner to Kenneth
to the Toledo Peoria and Western; Richmond-Eaton to the Norfolk and Western,
and Michigan City-Buchanan to AMTRAK (this is mainly a passenger train line).
Of the segments still excluded, top priority should go to the segment
of the Indianapolis-Richmond line serving Cambridge City, Knightstown and
Carthage; it is incredible that this was omitted. (A connection is required
at Knightstown.) Next would come the N„ Madison-Madison line, and then the
lines serving Auburn, Brookville, LaGrange, and Berne.

I. Illinois
The original DOT plan for Illinois called for drastic abandonments,
including several through routes of substantial traffic volume. This in turn
produced strong protests. The PSP greatly reduced the mileage to be abandoned,
limiting it primarily to the old New York Central line to Cairo in southern Illinois,
except for minor segments, and the former - Pennsylvania line from Terre Haute to
Peoria. In the final plan, additional segments of the Cairo line were retained to
facilate through movement of coal.
Except for four short lines in the Peru area and a segment south from
01ms tead in southern Illinois, the lines to be abandoned under FSP are listed
below, grouped by priority for retention;

Segments
Top Priority
Miles
605B Hutsonville- II
Robinson
Towns left without
rail service s and
carloads 1974
Hutsonville, 2146
cars per week cars per mile
71 337
This line serves a major power plant, and retention is imperative; it is
incredible that the segment was not included in CGNRAIL
11* 30*611 (part) Midland City- 6
Waynesville *
rii]ye'~TPe 1
Tabor 356
Waynesville 183
577A Kankakee-
Sheff
Beaverville 264
Donovan 184
Iri&qucis 109
40 60
These two lines
>
primarily serving grain elevators, clearly have adequate
traffic to be able to cover their costs if locally operated.
Priority :
Part of 609 Lovington- 9
Prairie Hall
subsegment
Marginal
:
611
611b
609
Marca-
Midland City 13
Atlanta-
East Peoria' 39
Remainder of
Paris-Decatur
Line 64
Sub Marginal :
605a Paris-
Hutsonville
415 Frankfort-
Mattes on 3
33
Lake City 172
Prairie Hall 148
Armington 75
21*
13
ns
.2
15*
Frankfort 139
23
ns
.3
1.7
Figures for entire segment. 2. May be acquired by Illinois Terminal
1. May be acquired by Burlington Northern ns Not mailable separately
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The original plan of the Illinois Terminal to acquire the entire line from
East Peoria to Decatur has apparently been thwarted by inability to obtain transfer
of the Penn Central's trackage rights nver the Illinois Central Gulf from Decatur to
Maroa.
The former New York Central main line from Paris to Pana and St. Louis
is included in CONRAIL but with the warning that CONRAIL may seek to abandon
this line after the route via Effingham is improved. The portion south of
Pana is also used by the Missouri Pacific and would be offered for sale to it.
'
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14. Passenger Service (PSP, pp.. 167-89; 303-07; FSP, pp. 37-46; RSPO, pp.
16-17; 69-71; ICC,
-pp. 15-25).
While CONRAIL is to be a freight-only service, the report devotes
considerable attention to passenger service in the area. The development
of AMTRAK has resulted from recognition of the need for preservation of
*
some intercity rail service, and the inevitable deficit position of AMTRAK
has finally been recognized. The key points in the report's analysis
include the following conclusions:
1. With a substantial volume of traffic, rail passenger service is
much more energy-efficient than air service, although less efficient than
bus service, except where volume is very high.
2. Potential conflict between freight and passenger service in the
Northeast corridor suggests the need for separating the two, transferring
freight service to the B and line and confining the Penn Central line
to passenger service (plus local freight )
.
Certain tracg outside the corridor should be transferred to /•nTRAK
because of primary use for passenger service. The ICC raises question
about some of those proposals.
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3. Additional corridors are suggested, with service improvement over
present AMTRAK service, as for example, Chicago-Detroit. Track improvements
would be limited to those required for high speed freight service.
4. Clearly, pass anger operations should be charged all costs for which
they are responsible (but not a share of common costs) since freight
service should not be required to subsidize passenger service.
Concluding Observations
Analysis of the preliminary and final plan and the RSPO and ICC evaluation
subbests the following observations:
1. USRA is being unreasonably harsh in its elimination of light
traffic lines, applying stricter standards than those applied to the system
as a whole. USRA has become a victim of the trite "need for slimming down"
philosophy, rationalizing far more track elimination than is economically
justifiable. If Indiana is reasonably typical, inclusion of about 19%
of the mileage proposed for abandonment would have negligible and possibly
positive effects on CONRAIL earnings, and an additional 15% would have very
minor adverse effects. Inclusion of the 342 would eliminate most of the
opposition to the plan. The great danger of the USRA policy, like that of
DOT before it, is overkill; by failing to include the lines in the system
for which there is strong support, the result may be that Congress will
reject the plan or require the inclusion of too many lines. In addition,
substantial injury is currently resulting as firms on these lines delay
expansions— thus making the financial situation cf the lines worse.
2. At the other extreme, a substantial portion of the mileage is
useless, contributing little to anyone, and constituting a serious
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financial drain. About 42% of the mileage proposed by USRA for abandonment
in Indiana is in this category. The remaining 24% is very marginal and
retention can be justified only under special local circumstances. The
basic trouble with the RSPO proposal of freezing all lines for two years
is that this hopeless 42% would be included along with the rest. A more
rational approach by USRA would have avoided this hazard.
3. While a reconstituted CONRAIL may be able to cover its costs,
one cannot help but wonder where the miracles are coming from in the
transition to do this. The RSPO evaluation is much more realistic.
Unfortunately, however, recognition of this fact for a time caused elements
in the Administration to seek to back away from the CONRAIL plan, endorsing
"controlled liquidation" or sale of lines to solvent roads. But the great
difficulty with the approach is that it would produce endless timeconsuming
legal battles among the various roads seeking particular pieces, and the
administration has dropped it, at least for the immediate future.

V4. The MARC-EL proposal in. the east had merit as an
alternative to preserve competition, but neither USRA nor RSPG recognizes
that it is most unlikely that such a road could be economically viable
without continuing Federal aid. As experience in the air transport industry
has shown, merging several weak lines merely produces a large weak line
(e.g., Hughes Air West), not a strong one. The continuing deficits do
not constitute a controlling argument against this approach, but must be
recognized.
5. Neither USRA nor RSPO give adequate attention to the labor
problems of the rail industry. An essential step is the negotiation of
industry and labor agreements that will provide adequate protection to
v
workers but allow much greater flexibility in the use of labor and reduction
in crew sizes in some operations. Railway labor has unfortunately developed
a rather bad public image, which in turn makes shippers and Congress less
willing to provide assistance to the industry. Many of the beliefs about
union policy are erroneous—but the bad image is an unfortunate barrier
for the industry. But clearly by some adjustments in contracts, labor
productivity could be increased materially, allowing, ultimately , higher
wages rather than lower, yet providing adequate security protection.
6. The program for local subsidy does not provide adequate time for
state-local action, and the two year limit on federal subsidies is objectionable
given national interest in continued operation of the marginal line.?. ,

<'vO
The Future of the Plan
As this is written 9 Congress will shortly consider; 1. Whether to reject
the plan or not. If. Congress does not act, the plan automatically becomes effective.
«
If it rejects the plan, the various agencies must start all over again; meanwhile,
the bankrupt roads drift on and the reconstruction task will become more serious.
2. Since the plan requires more funds than the original act authorizes,
provisions of the additional money if the plan is to be implemented. The administra-
tion has indicated, however, that it will not approve the additional funds unless
Congress also passes deregulatory measures proposed by the administration. Long
experience suggests that this tactic on the part of the Administration is politically
an extremely unwise one, regardless of the merits of the deregulation legislation.
3. Action to free Chessie from any obligations arising out of suits relating
to property it is scheduled to acquire from the bankrupt lines^ otherwise the
acquisition x^ill not be made.
Congress has facing it various proposals relating to amendment of the
subsidy provisions, ranging from RSPO's proposals to freeze all abandonment with
full Federal subsidy to ones retaining the 70-30 formula but liberalizing the
requirements and providing for further study of marginal lines.





7.9A

